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Abstract
We review with a tutorial scope the information theory foundations of
quantum statistical physics. Only a small proportion of the variables that
characterize a system at the microscopic scale can be controlled, for both
practical and theoretical reasons, and a probabilistic description involv-
ing the observers is required. The criterion of maximum von Neumann
entropy is then used for making reasonable inferences. It means that no
spurious information is introduced besides the known data. Its outcomes
can be given a direct justification based on the principle of indifference
of Laplace. We introduce the concept of relevant entropy associated with
some set of relevant variables; it characterizes the information that is
missing at the microscopic level when only these variables are known. For
equilibrium problems, the relevant variables are the conserved ones, and
the Second Law is recovered as a second step of the inference process. For
non-equilibrium problems, the increase of the relevant entropy expresses
an irretrievable loss of information from the relevant variables towards
the irrelevant ones. Two examples illustrate the flexibility of the choice
of relevant variables and the multiplicity of the associated entropies: the
thermodynamic entropy (satisfying the Clausius–Duhem inequality) and
the Boltzmann entropy (satisfying the H-theorem). The identification
of entropy with missing information is also supported by the paradox of
Maxwell’s demon. Spin-echo experiments show that irreversibility itself
is not an absolute concept: use of hidden information may overcome the
arrow of time.
keywords : quantum probabilities, inference, reduced description, relevant
entropies, irreversibility paradox.
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1 Probabilities in theoretical physics
The purpose of this contribution is to present an overview of the approach to
statistical mechanics based on information theory. The concept of information,
intimately connected with that of probability, gives indeed insight on questions
of statistical mechanics such as the meaning of irreversibility. This concept was
introduced in statistical physics by Brillouin (1956) and Jaynes (1957) soon
after its discovery by Shannon in 1948 (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). An im-
mense literature has since then been published, ranging from research articles
to textbooks. The variety of topics that belong to this field of science makes
it impossible to give here a bibliography, and special searches are necessary for
deepening the understanding of one or another aspect. For tutorial introduc-
tions, somewhat more detailed than the present one, see R. Balian (1991-92;
2004).
The meaning of probabilities, on which the concept of information relies,
has long been a subject of controversy (Cox, 1946). They were introduced
in the theory of games as frequencies of occurrence, directly related to the
counting of configurations, and could be viewed in this framework as properties
of the system in itself. This objective interpretation contrasts with the so-called
subjective interpretation, which was initiated by Bayes and Laplace, and later
on advocated by Jaynes (1957) and de Finetti (1974).
While the mathematicians who focus on the structure of the theory of proba-
bilities do not adopt a definite position on their objective or subjective meaning,
the physicists who apply them should worry about their interpretation. Most
physicists have reached a spontaneous, often implicit, philosophical position in-
spired by their daily practice, which combines subjectivism and materialism.
During the XIXth century, science was generally considered as a discovery of
Laws of nature existing outside us; in such an activity the observer can be dis-
regarded once the exploration stage is over. The development of microphysics
during the XXth century has led the physicists to lay more emphasis on the role
of the observer. Theory is generally regarded as the construction of a partly
imperfect image of the external world in our minds, which however becomes
less and less blurred, more and more faithful as science progresses. Mathemat-
ics provide the precise language which allows us to build this image; among
mathematics, probabilities are the tool on which we rely to make quantitative
predictions in a consistent and rational way, starting from the available infor-
mation, in spite of various uncertainties. It is remarkable that the introduction
of probabilities in our most fundamental theories has not prevented physics to
become more and more efficient.
The existence of barriers between the reality and us, which cannot be over-
come at least at the present stage of physics, has become manifest in two differ-
ent theoretical frameworks. On the one hand, the unification and the simplicity
of the Laws of microphysics have led to a considerable development of statistical
mechanics. It has become clear that all properties of materials at the macro-
scopic scale, whether mechanical, thermal or electromagnetic, can in principle
be explained by starting from their microscopic structure. Macroscopic theories
2
are then reduced to a phenomenological status. Even the Laws of thermodynam-
ics have now lost their status of fundamental science since they can be derived
from microphysics. However, describing fully a macroscopic object in terms
of its microscopic constituents would require to deal with an inaccessibly large
number of degrees of freedom. Neither can we control them experimentally nor
even can we handle them numerically. Our only issue is a probabilistic treat-
ment, where probabilities account for our lack of knowledge about, for instance,
the positions and velocities of the molecules in a classical gas.
On the other hand, microscopic systems are governed by quantum mechan-
ics. There, physical quantities are mathematically represented as recalled in
section 2 by elements of a non-commutative algebra. This feature implies, in
particular, Heisenberg’s inequality which expresses that two non-commuting
variables (such as the position and the momentum of a particle, the three com-
ponents of its angular momentum, the electromagnetic field and the number
of photons, or the electric and magnetic fields at the same point) necessarily
display statistical fluctuations: The values of such variables cannot be specified
simultaneously. Here we need probabilities not only for practical reasons as in
classical statistical mechanics, but because the fundamental theory itself im-
plies intrinsic fluctuations. It is not simply the values of the physical variables
which are incompletely known, but it is the very concept of physical quantities
which, as a matter of principle, makes them simultaneously inaccessible. Their
non-commutative nature forbids us to imagine that we might fully determine
them. It is impossible to assume that, underlying our probabilistic description,
the state of a microscopic system at a given time could be characterized by the
values of its full set of physical variables. This impossibility, which contrasts
with the use of probabilities in the description of systems in classical statisti-
cal mechanics, is exemplified by Bell’s inequalities and by the GHZ paradox
(Greenberger et al, 1990) that we shall briefly review at the end of section 2.
In both cases, and a fortiori in quantum statistical mechanics, we are led
to always treat physical quantities as random. The probabilities that govern
them occur either for practical reasons because we cannot hope to describe in
full detail a macroscopic system, or for theoretical reasons because quantum
fluctuations prevent us from thinking that the whole set of physical quantities
needed to describe a system in the quantum formalism may take well-defined
values. Thus the probabilities of quantum statistical physics cannot be regarded
as properties of a system as such, but they characterize the knowledge about
this system of its observers in the considered conditions. The probability law
adequately describing the system depends on the information available to the
observer or on the number of variables that he may control. Probabilities there-
fore appear as having a partly subjective nature, on rather inter-subjective since
two observers placed in the same conditions will assign the same probability law
to a system.
Moreover, such a probabilistic description does not refer to a single object.
Explicitly or implicitly we regard this object as belonging to a statistical ensem-
ble of similar objects, all prepared under similar conditions and characterized
by the same set of given data. This ensemble may be real, if we deal with
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predictions about repeated experiments, or gedanken, if we deal with a single
event.
Even though quantum mechanics requires the use of probabilities to describe
systems at the microscopic scale, and even though these probabilities charac-
terize the knowledge of observers about such systems, the theory also displays
objective features that depend on the systems only. Indeed, as we shall recall
below, the microscopic equations of motion of an isolated system are fully deter-
ministic since the Hamiltonian operator is exactly known. (For most properties
of atoms, molecules and macroscopic materials, only the very simple kinetic
energy and electromagnetic interactions of the elementary constituents, the nu-
clei and the electrons, are relevant.) Whereas at each time the statistics of the
physical quantities are accounted for by a probability law, the evolution of this
law is governed at the microscopic scale by the reversible equation (2) below,
which depends only on the object studied. The probability distribution, which
characterizes our knowledge, is transferred from one time to another in a deter-
ministic way – unless we drop information or unless part of the Hamiltonian is
ill-known.
Other objective features can also emerge at the macroscopic scale. Owing to
the large number of constituents, the probability distribution for many macro-
scopic variables can be sharply peaked. The uncertainties of the observers and
the subjective aspect of probabilities can then be disregarded, and statistical
predictions are replaced by objective assertions, which hold even for a single
object.
The first stage of an inference consists in assigning to the system a prob-
ability distribution that accounts for the available data but is otherwise unbi-
ased. Then, predictions are derived from this distribution by means of stan-
dard techniques of statistical physics. For instance, we may wish to predict
the two-particle correlation function in a simple liquid at equilibrium, so as to
understand how it scatters light; in this problem the data which characterize
the macroscopic equilibrium state are the energy and particle number per unit
volume. This correlation function can be deduced from the density in phase,
that is, the probability distribution of the N particles of the liquid in the 6N -
dimensional phase space. However a preliminary question should be solved:
From the sole knowledge of the energy and the particle number, how should we
reasonably choose this probability distribution?
2 The formalism of quantum (statistical) me-
chanics
We shall work within the framework of quantum statistical mechanics (Thirring,
1981, 1983; Balian, 1989), which is conceptually somewhat simpler than clas-
sical statistical mechanics. To avoid mathematical complications, we consider
finite systems only and assume that the thermodynamic limit for extensive sys-
tems is taken in the end. The discreteness of spectra is then a feature which
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allows to by-pass some difficulties arising in classical statistical mechanics from
the continuity of the variables. For instance, the classical limit of quantum sta-
tistical mechanics generates the suitable measure in the 6N -dimensional phase
space; this measure includes a factor 1N ! issued from the Pauli principle for in-
distinguishable particles, which ensures the extensivity of entropy and solves the
Gibbs paradox. These facts can be explained in the framework of classical sta-
tistical mechanics (van Kampen, 1984), but less automatically. Obtaining the
Third Law of thermodynamics as a consequence of statistical mechanics also
requires quantization, since the behaviour at low temperatures of the entropy
of a macroscopic system is governed by the low energy behaviour of its level
density.
The mathematical description of a physical system in quantum mechanics
involves a Hilbert space, and the physical quantities are represented by the
Hermitean operators Aˆ in this space. As indicated in the introduction, these
operators, termed observables, play the roˆle of random variables but constitute
a non-commutative algebra. For instance, the three components of the spin 12
of a fermion are described in a 2-dimensional Hilbert space by the Pauli opera-
tors σˆx, σˆy , σˆz, which are characterized by the algebra σˆiσˆj = i
∑
k εijkσˆk; for
a particle on a line, the algebra is generated by the position and momentum
operators xˆ and pˆ in the Hilbert space of wavefunctions, with [xˆ, pˆ] = i~. The
specific features of quantum physics, compared to the standard probability the-
ory or to the classical statistical mechanics, lie in this non-commutation of the
observables.
In quantum mechanics, the “state of a system”, whatever formalism is used
to characterize it (wavefunction, state vector, density matrix, etc), is an ir-
reducibly probabilistic concept. As stressed in the introduction, one cannot
imagine the existence of an underlying, purely objective description in terms of
the values of all the physical quantities attached to the system. We are led to
adhere to the Bayesian or Laplacian subjective conception of probabilities, and
to regard the “state” as the best possible description of the system, which allows
us to make any possible probabilistic prediction about it – or rather about the
statistical ensemble to which it belongs.
A set of probabilities is equivalent to the collection of expectation values
that they allow us to evaluate. A quantum state is thus characterized by the
correspondence Aˆ 7→
〈
Aˆ
〉
≡ A which associates with any observable Aˆ its ex-
pectation value A in the considered situation. This correspondence has a few
natural properties. The hermiticity of Aˆ entails that A is real (quantum me-
chanics involves complex numbers, but physical predictions yield real numbers).
For the unit operator,
〈
Iˆ
〉
= 1. The correspondence is linear; in fact, the lin-
earity
〈
Aˆ+ Bˆ
〉
=
〈
Aˆ
〉
+
〈
Bˆ
〉
for any pair of commuting observables Aˆ and
Bˆ is sufficient to imply linearity for the whole set of observables (provided the
dimension of the Hilbert space is larger than 2: Gleason’s theorem). Finally
the statistical fluctuation of a physical quantity is expressed as
〈
Aˆ2
〉
−
〈
Aˆ
〉2
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in terms of the expectation values (1). Imposing that
〈
Aˆ2
〉
is non-negative for
any Hermitean Aˆ expresses that a variance cannot be negative.
For finite systems these properties are implemented through the existence
of a density operator Dˆ in Hilbert space which represents the state. The above
correspondence from observables to their expectation values is expressed as
Aˆ 7→
〈
Aˆ
〉
≡ A = Tr AˆDˆ , (1)
where Dˆ is a Hermitean positive operator with unit trace. The density operator
thus gathers our whole probabilistic information about the full set of observables
of the system. It plays with respect to observables the same roˆle as a usual
probability distribution does with respect to random variables. A wavefunction
or a state vector |Ψ〉 appears as nothing but a special case of density operator;
in this case Dˆ = |Ψ〉 〈Ψ| reduces to a projection on the considered pure state
and the expectation values (1) read A = 〈Ψ| Aˆ |Ψ〉. Note that, due to the
irreducibly probabilistic nature of the quantum theory, there is no conceptual
difference between “quantum mechanics” and “quantum statistical mechanics”,
since a wavefunction is nothing but a means for evaluating probabilities.
For time-dependent problems, we need in order to make predictions to ex-
press how this information (1), given at some time, is transformed at later times.
This is expressed in the Schro¨dinger picture by letting Dˆ depend on time while
the observables Aˆ remain fixed. For an isolated system, with given Hamiltonian
Hˆ, the evolution of Dˆ (t) is governed by the Liouville–von Neumann equation
of motion:
i~
dDˆ
dt
=
[
Hˆ, Dˆ
]
. (2)
Whereas the definition of quantum states involves both the system and the
observers and has a subjective aspect because the density operator appears
as a tool to make consistent predictions from the available information, the
evolution refers to the system only. This purely objective nature of the evolution
is made clear in the alternative Heisenberg picture, where the density operator
Dˆ remains fixed while the observables change in time according to Heisenberg’s
equation of motion
i~
dAˆ
dt
=
[
Aˆ, Hˆ
]
, (3)
which is deterministic and reversible. Equations (2) and (3) are equivalent as
regards the evolution of the expectation values (1). Heisenberg’s equation (3)
exhibits better the fact that the dynamics is a property of the considered system,
since it deals with the observables which represent mathematically the physical
quantities belonging to this system, independently of observation. In fact, eq.
(3) simply expresses that the operator algebra remains unchanged in time while
the various observables Aˆ evolve; this property is equivalent to the unitary of
the evolution, with the Hamiltonian as generator of the unitary motion. As
another advantage, Heisenberg’s picture allows us to evaluate correlations be-
tween observables of the same system taken at different times. However, because
6
we focus below on information, we shall start from Schro¨dinger’s picture rather
than Heisenberg’s. When expressed by means of (2) instead of (3), the evolution
takes a subjective aspect, since (2) describes the transfer of information from
some observables to other ones generated by a completely known dynamics. We
can then modify eq. (2) so as to account for losses of information that may take
place during a dynamical process.
In the classical limit, observables Aˆ are replaced by commuting random vari-
ables, which are functions of the positions and momenta of the N particles. Den-
sity operators Dˆ are replaced by probability densities D in the 6N -dimensional
phase space, and the trace in (1) by an integration over this space. The evolution
of D is governed by the Liouville equation.
To conclude this section, we show how the irreducibly probabilistic nature of
quantum states follows from the non-commutation of the observables. Consider
first two physical quantities represented by two observables Aˆ and Bˆ which do
not commute,
[
Aˆ, Bˆ
]
= 2iCˆ. Since for any λ the operator
(
Aˆ+ iλBˆ
)(
Aˆ− iλBˆ
)
can be regarded as the square of a Hermitean operator (as obvious by diago-
nalization), its expectation value is non-negative, which implies
〈
Aˆ2
〉〈
Bˆ2
〉
≥〈
Cˆ
〉2
. This Heisenberg’s inequality sets a lower bound to statistical fluctua-
tions (for instance, 2Cˆ = ~ for Aˆ = xˆ, Bˆ = pˆ yields ∆xˆ∆pˆ ≥ ~/2). Accordingly,
non-commuting physical quantities are incompatible: They cannot be measured
nor even specified simultaneously.
Bell’s inequalities and the GHZ paradox (Greenberger et al, 1990) also arise
from non-commutation. Consider, for instance, three spins σˆ(m), m = 1, 2,
3; define the observables Aˆ(1) ≡ σˆ
(1)
x , Bˆ(1) ≡ σˆ
(2)
z σˆ
(3)
z , Cˆ(1) ≡ Aˆ(1)Bˆ(1), and
Aˆ(m), Bˆ(m), Cˆ(m) by cyclic permutation. All of them have +1 and −1 as
eigenvalues, the Aˆ’s commute with one another as well as the Bˆ’s and A(m)
commutes with Bˆ(m). For m 6= n, Aˆ(m) and Bˆ(n) anticommute, so that the
three observables Cˆ(n) commute with one another. Hence, we can imagine
that the 3-spin system is prepared in a pure state |Ψ〉 which is the common
eigenvector of Cˆ(1), Cˆ(2) and Cˆ(3) characterized by their eigenvalues c(1), c(2),
c(3) all equal to +1. In this state, the fact that Cˆ(1) ≡ Aˆ(1)Bˆ(1) takes the
value c(1) = +1 implies that a(1) = b(1); more precisely, if we were to mea-
sure Aˆ(1) and Bˆ(1) simultaneously (they commute), we would find for them
either the values a(1) = b(1) = +1 or the values a(1) = b(1) = −1 (with equal
probabilities since the expectation value of Aˆ(1) or Bˆ(1) vanishes). Likewise
we can assert the complete correlations a(2) = b(2) and a(3) = b(3). How-
ever the above definitions and algebraic relations imply the operator identities
Bˆ(1)Bˆ(2)Bˆ(3) ≡ Iˆ and Cˆ(1)Cˆ(2)Cˆ(3) ≡ −Aˆ(1)Aˆ(2)Aˆ(3). Hence, although the
three statements a(1) = b(1), a(2) = b(2) and a(3) = b(3) (in the above sense) are
separately true, they cannot be true together : Since the product Aˆ(1)Aˆ(2)Aˆ(3)
takes the value −c(1)c(2)c(3) = −1 in the considered state |Ψ〉, the simultane-
ous measurement of Aˆ(1), Aˆ(2) and Aˆ(3) (which commute) is expected to yield
values a(1), a(2) and a(3) equal to +1 or −1, but necessarily with a product
a(1)a(2)a(3) = −1, in contradiction to the naive prediction a(1)a(2)a(3) = +1
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which would result from a(1) = b(1), a(2) = b(2), a(3) = b(3), b(1)b(2)b(3) = +1.
This has been experimentally confirmed. Thus, everyday’s logics is violated.
The only issue is to regard the “state” not as a property of the system alone,
but as a probabilistic means for prediction. The current expression “the state
of the system” that we used (and that we may still use for convenience below)
is improper; it is meant as “the probability distribution (for non-commuting
physical quantities) which allows us to predict the properties of the statistical
ensemble in which the system is embedded”. Indeed, we can safely predict that
a measurement of Aˆ(1) and Bˆ(1) will give a(1) = b(1) for any element of the
ensemble, and likewise for Aˆ(2) and Bˆ(2). However, such measurements must
be performed with different apparatuses on different samples (described by the
same state vector |Ψ〉), because Aˆ(1) and Bˆ(2) do not commute and hence cannot
be measured nor even specified simultaneously. We cannot find in the ensemble
any system for which Aˆ(1) takes with certainty, say, the value a(1) = +1 and
Bˆ(2) the value b(2) = +1: The assertion that both a(1) = b(1) and a(2) = b(2)
is meaningless. The contradiction existing between the equalities a(1) = b(1),
a(2) = b(2), a(3) = b(3), b(1)b(2)b(3) = 1 and a(1)a(2)a(3) = −1 implies that we
should not regard the two correlations a(1) = b(1) and a(2) = b(2) as intrinsic
properties of the system, but rather consider each one as an exact prediction
about a specific measurement, namely that of Aˆ(1) and Bˆ(1) in one case, that
of Aˆ(2) and Bˆ(2) in the other case, the measurements of Aˆ(1) and Bˆ(2) being
incompatible. The state vector |Ψ〉 itself, which synthesizes all such information,
does not describe intrinsic properties of the systems belonging to the considered
ensemble, but rather tells us how they would behave in some experiment or
another. Each assertion such as a(1) = b(1) (which to be tested would require
an interaction of a system with an apparatus measuring Aˆ(1) and Bˆ(1)), is true
only in a given context, which should be specified even if the measurement is not
actually performed. The interpretation of quantum mechanics is thus tightly
connected with measurement theory. The type of correlations that it involves
cannot be accounted for in terms of hidden variables.
3 The measure of uncertainty
The knowledge embodied in a density operator Dˆ is always probabilistic, since
Dˆ provides us only with the expectation values (1). At least some among the
variances evaluated from (1) must be finite, due to non-commutation, because
there exists no common eigenvector for the whole set of observables. It is there-
fore natural to wonder whether one density operator is more informative than
another (Thirring, 1983; Balian, 1991). To this aim we associate with each Dˆ a
number, the von Neumann entropy
SvN
(
Dˆ
)
= −Tr Dˆ ln Dˆ , (4)
which measures in dimensionless units our uncertainty when Dˆ summarizes our
statistical knowledge on the system. This quantity is the quantum analogue
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of Shannon’s entropy −
∑
m pm ln pm; the latter number measures the amount
of information which is missing on average when we wait for the reception of
some message belonging to a set {m}, if each message m is expected to occur
with a probability pm (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). However, here, there will
be no reception of a message since we shall never observe fully the system at
the microscopic scale. The quantity S
(
Dˆ
)
qualifies merely our present knowl-
edge through Dˆ, without reference to future observations which can change our
information.
We may also interpret S
(
Dˆ
)
as a measure of the disorder that we are facing
when our information is characterized by Dˆ. This identification of the concept
of disorder with a lack of knowledge may seem questionable, since disorder
seems an objective property of the system whereas information is attached to
the observer. However, even in everyday’s life, we can recognize that disorder
is a relative property. My desk may look quite disordered to a visitor, but
it is for me in perfect order, if I am able to retrieve immediately any one of
the many files that lie scattered on it. Likewise, a pack of cards fully mixed
by a conjurer is disordered for the audience, but not for him, if he has kept
knowledge of the ordering of the cards. Information theory allows us to make
quantitative Maxwell’s remark about the concept of order: “Confusion, like the
correlative term order, is not a property of material things in themselves, but
only in relation to the mind who perceives them”.
Historically, Boltzmann was the first to identify, in many successive works,
the entropy of thermodynamics with a functional of the distribution in phase
space of classical statistical mechanics – even though the concept of probabil-
ity was not yet fully settled. Von Neumann extended this idea to quantum
physics by introducing the definition (4). The existence of these expressions
inspired Shannon (1949) when he created the theory of communication, which
is based on the possibility of assigning numbers to amounts of information. In
this context, the subjective nature of entropy is manifest. From the fact that it
measures the missing information associated with the probability distribution
for the considered set of messages, it appeared that it was a general concept
complementing probability. With this new interpretation as lack of informa-
tion at the microscopic scale, the concept has returned to statistical physics
(Brillouin, 1956; Jaynes, 1957), throwing new lights on entropy.
The von Neumann entropy is characterized by many properties which con-
firm its interpretation as a measure of uncertainty. It is additive for uncorrelated
systems, subadditive for correlated ones (which means that suppressing correla-
tions raises the uncertainty), concave (which means that putting together two
different statistical ensembles for the same system produces a mixed ensem-
ble which has a larger uncertainty than the average of the uncertainties of the
original ensembles). The maximum lnW of (4) is obtained, for a finite Hilbert
space with dimension W when Dˆ = Iˆ/W . Its minimum 0 is obtained for pure
states Dˆ, which are the least uncertain states that quantum mechanics allows,
although they are still probabilistic.
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4 Maximum entropy criterion
The availability of the density operator Dˆ at a given time t0 allows us to make
any statistical prediction on the considered system (or more precisely on a sta-
tistical ensemble to which it belongs), either at the same time through (1), or
at later times through (2). However, a preliminary problem arises. During the
preparation of the system, before the time t0, only a small set of data are con-
trolled. Let us denote as Aˆi the observables that are controlled, and as Ai their
expectation values for the considered set of repeated experiments. From this
partial information we wish to infer other quantities. In other words, we wish
to assign to the system a density operator Dˆ, by relying on the sole knowledge
of the set
Ai = Tr AˆiDˆ . (5)
The maximum entropy criterion consists in selecting, among all the den-
sity operators subject to the constraints (5), the one, DˆR, which renders the
von Neumann entropy (4) maximum (Jaynes, 1957). An intuitive justification
is the following: for any other Dˆ compatible with (5), we have by construction
SvN
(
Dˆ
)
< SvN
(
DˆR
)
. The choice of DˆR thus ensures that our description
involves no more information than the minimum needed to account for the only
available information (5). The difference S
(
DˆR
)
−S
(
Dˆ
)
measures some extra
information included in Dˆ, but not in DˆR, and hence, not in the only known
expectation values Ai. Selecting DˆR rather than any other Dˆ which satisfies
(5) is therefore the least biased choice, the one that allows the most reasonable
predictions drawn from the known set Ai about other arbitrary quantities (1).
We may also interpret the maximum entropy criterion as the choice of the
most uncertain state among those which satisfy the constraints (5) imposed by
the data Ai, or equivalently of the most disordered one. This criterion may
be regarded as a generalization of Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason (or
Bayes’s principle), which states that equal probabilities should be assigned to all
possible events in case nothing is known about the occurrence of these events.
Indeed, if the Hilbert space associated with the system has a finite dimension
W , the entropy is largest when Dˆ is proportional to the unit matrix Iˆ, so that
the criterion yields DˆR = Iˆ/W , describing equiprobability, in case there are no
constraints (5) on expectation values.
This use of the lack of information as a tool for statistical inference has
a weakness: it relies on the assumption that SvN is the adequate measure of
bias in statistical physics. Direct justifications of the outcome of the maximum
entropy criterion, based on some requirements of consistency of the inference
procedure, have therefore been given. They are discussed in detail by Uffink
(1995).
An alternative direct justification relies on the introduction of a “supersys-
tem”, made of a large number N of mental copies α = 1, 2, . . .N of the system
in hand. The statistical data are the same for all individual systems α, i.e., the
observables Aˆi,α (α = 1, 2, . . .N ) have the same expectation value Ai. This value
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is identified with the value of the average observable N−1
∑
α Aˆi,α pertaining
to the supersystem, which has weak statistical fluctuations (at most in N−1/2,
due to non-commutation of the observables Aˆi). Such an identification throws
a bridge between the subjective and frequencial interpretations of probabilities.
The maximum entropy criterion then arises merely as a consequence of the prin-
ciple of insufficient reason applied to the supersystem. This idea was introduced
by Gibbs in the case where the only datum (5) is the energy: he showed that,
for large N , each system α is in canonical equilibrium if a microcanonical dis-
tribution is assigned to the supersystem. The extension to quantum statistical
mechanics, with non-commuting observables Aˆi, was worked out by Balian and
Balazs (1987).
5 Generalized Gibbsian distributions and rele-
vant entropy
For any given set of relevant observables Aˆi, the expectation values Ai of which
are known, the maximum of the von Neumann entropy (4) under the constraints
(5) is readily found by introducing Lagrangian multipliers, γi associated with
each equation (5) and Ψ associated with the normalization of Dˆ. Its value,
SvN
(
DˆR
)
, is reached for a density operator of the form
DˆR = exp
[
−Ψ−
∑
i
γi Aˆi
]
, (6)
where the multipliers are determined by
Tr DˆR Aˆi = Ai , Tr DˆR = 1 . (7)
This least biased density operator has an exponential form, which generalizes the
usual Gibbs distributions and which arises from the logarithm in the definition of
the von Neumann entropy. The concavity of the von Neumann entropy ensures
the unicity of DˆR.
The equations (7) can conveniently be written by introducing a generalized
thermodynamic potential Ψ (γi), defined as function of the other multipliers γi
by
Ψ (γi) ≡ lnTr exp
[
−
∑
i
γiAˆi
]
. (8)
The relations between the data Ai and the multipliers γi are then implemented
as
∂Ψ
∂γi
= −Ai . (9)
The corresponding entropy SvN
(
DˆR
)
≡ SR (Ai) is a function of the variables
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Ai (or equivalently γi), found from (4), (5) and (6) as
SR (Ai) = Ψ +
∑
i
γiAi . (10)
We term it the relevant entropy associated with the set Aˆi of relevant observables
selected in the considered situation. By construction, it measures the amount
of information which is missing when only the data Ai are available. Eq. (10)
exhibits SR (Ai) as the Legendre transform of Ψ (γi). The relations (9) between
the variables γi and the variables Ai can therefore be inverted as
∂SR
∂Ai
= γi . (11)
The following examples will show that the concept of relevant entropy en-
compasses various types of entropies, introduced in different contexts.
6 Equilibrium thermodynamics
As stressed by Callen (1975) the Laws of thermodynamics do not deal with
dynamics, but with the comparison of the initial and the final equilibrium states
of a system. At the macroscopic level, an equilibrium state is characterized by
the values Ai of a set of extensive conservative variables, such as energies or
particle numbers. In fact, the thermodynamic laws also hold for metastable
states which behave as stable states for small variations of the parameters.
In such cases, the thermodynamic variables Ai include the nearly conserved
quantities, which strictly speaking obey no conservation law but are conserved
over the time scale of the considered process. This occurs, for instance, below a
transition point for an order parameter, or when some a priori allowed chemical
reaction does not take place under the prevailing conditions. The concept of
equilibrium is thus relative: it depends on the efficiency of the interactions and
many equilibria are not truly stable, but metastable over very long times. (As
an extreme example, we may note that nuclear forces are effective only within
each nucleus of a material; although strong, they are inhibited between one
nucleus and another by the Coulomb repulsion. Nuclear equilibrium, which
would imply that nuclear reactions have transformed both the light and the
heavy nuclei through fusion or fission into iron nuclei, is never reached.)
Callen’s statement of the Second Law refers to an isolated, compound system,
in which we include the possible sources of heat or work. Each subsystem is a
homogeneous piece of extensive matter. In the data Ai that characterize the
initial and the final state of the whole system, the index i denotes both the
subsystem and the nature of the variable (energy, number of particles of each
kind, volume). Various exchanges of such quantities may take place between the
subsystems under the effect of interactions. In the initial state these exchanges
are prohibited by some constraints, which express that the interactions between
subsystems are dropped, so that the variables Ai can be specified independently.
12
Later on, some interactions are restored so that some constraints are released.
We wish to know the values of the variables Ai in the final equilibrium state thus
reached. The answer is given by the Second Law, which postulates the existence
of the thermodynamic entropy Sth, a function of the variables Ai which has the
following properties (Callen, 1975). It is additive, being a sum of contributions
of all subsystems; for each subsystem, it is extensive and concave. The final
values of the variables Ai are then found by looking for the maximum of Sth,
under constraints imposed by the initial data through the conservation laws and
by possible inhibitions that forbid some exchanges between the subsystems.
This formulation of the foundations of thermodynamics is directly related to
the approach to statistical mechanics of sections 4 and 5, based on information
theory. It suffices to identify the thermodynamic extensive variables Ai with the
expectation values (5) of the conserved observables Aˆi. More precisely, the Aˆi’s
are the operators that commute with the Hamiltonian of the overall compound
system when the interactions between the subsystems are dropped. The expec-
tation values of the energies or of the particle numbers of the subsystems can
then be frozen. The macroscopic equilibrium state, characterized by the data
Ai, is identified microscopically with the most disordered state (6) accounting
for these data. This surmise can be justified statistically: if no other variable
than these conserved quantities Ai is controlled, reasonable predictions on any
other quantity should rely on the least biased choice (6). Moreover the vari-
ances of all the macroscopic variables are then weak (of relative orderN−1, when
N is the particle number); hence predictions about them can be made nearly
with certainty, as we observe macroscopically, and they are not affected by a
coarse-graining of (6). The assignment of the density operator (6) to an equilib-
rium state can also be justified dynamically through non-equilibrium statistical
mechanics, by showing that the Hamiltonian evolution (2), while keeping the
variables Ai constant, leads to the coarse-grained density operator with maxi-
mum disorder, as measured by the von Neumann entropy.
We thus identify the macroscopic thermodynamic entropy Sth (Ai) with the
microscopic relevant entropy SR (Ai), which was defined as the maximum of
the von Neumann entropy SvN
(
Dˆ
)
under the constraints (5) on the thermody-
namic variablesAi, frozen in the initial state. The properties of Sth postulated in
thermodynamics are thereby found as consequences of statistical mechanics: its
additivity arises from the factorization of the density operator (6) into contribu-
tions associated with each subsystem; its concavity results from the concavity of
SvN; its extensivity can be proved for a wide class of interparticle interactions
including the realistic interactions (Ruelle, 1969; Lieb, 1976; Thirring,1983).
The explicit form of Sth (Ai) can also be derived from microphysics, while only
its existence is asserted in thermodynamics.
When applied to the final state, the maximum entropy criterion of statistical
mechanics can be worked out in two steps. In the first step SvN is maximized
for fixed arbitrary values of the variables Ai; in the second step the outcome,
already identified with Sth (Ai), is maximized with respect to the variables Ai
subject to constraints imposed by the conservation laws and by the possible
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exchanges between subsystems. The Second Law then appears merely as the
second step of this maximization, which leads to the largest disorder.
Eqs. (9)-(11) reduce to standard equations in thermodynamics. In particular
the expression (11) of the multipliers γi allows us to identify them with Callen’s
intensive variables of thermodynamics; for instance, the multiplier γ associated
with the energy of a subsystem is the corresponding inverse temperature. Also,
Ψ is identified with a Massieu thermodynamic potential. Owing to the large
number of constituents of thermodynamic system, the statistical fluctuations of
the macroscopic variables are negligible, the probabilistic nature of statistical
physics which underlies thermodynamics becomes invisible, so that thermody-
namics appears as a deterministic theory. The thermodynamic entropy Sth,
although it can be identified with a measure of our lack of information about
the system at the microscopic scale, as well as the parameters γ entering the
density operator, reach an objective status and become meaningful for a single
macroscopic system.
7 Elimination of the irrelevant variables
In non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, a central problem consists in predicting
the values at the time t of some set of variables Ai from the knowledge of their
values at the initial time t0. The set of relevant observables Aˆi now contains
not only the constants of the motion and the quantities controlled or observed
experimentally, but also other macroscopic variables, chosen in such a way that
the variables Ai will eventually be coupled only to one another within a good
approximation. We shall return below to the choice of this set, which for the
time being we leave unspecified.
A general solution of this inference problem is provided by the projection
method of Nakajima and Zwanzig, which we only sketch here; for a simple
introduction, see Balian (1999). Since at the microscopic level the dynamics is
generated by the Liouville–von Neumann equation (2), the equations of motion
of Ai (t) should be generated from (2) and (5). We thus need first to transform
the initial conditions on Ai (t0) into initial conditions on Dˆ (t0). Since at the
initial time t0 nothing else than the set Ai (t0) is specified, the least biased
choice for Dˆ (t0) is given by the maximum entropy criterion, in the form (6),
(7).
From this initial state Dˆ (t0) = DˆR (t0), one derives the state Dˆ (t) at an
arbitrary time t by solving the equation of motion (2). The relevant variables
Ai (t) are then found from Dˆ (t) through (5), which formally solves our inference
problem. We give below a more explicit expression for this answer.
The von Neumann entropy (4) associated with Dˆ (t) remains constant in
time, as readily checked from the unitarity of the evolution (2). This means
that, if one considers all possible observables, no information is lost during the
evolution. However, in general, Dˆ (t) does not keep the exponential form (6),
which involves only the relevant observables Aˆi. Following the procedure of
sections 4 and 5, we can evaluate the lack of information associated with the
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knowledge of the variables Ai (t) only. It is measured by the relevant entropy
(10), where the multipliers γi (t) are now time-dependent and are expressed in
terms of the set Ai (t) through (9) or (11). By construction, we have
SR [Ai (t)] ≥ SvN
[
Dˆ (t)
]
= SvN
[
Dˆ (t0)
]
(12)
= SvN
[
DˆR (t0)
]
≡ SR [Ai (t0)] .
The fact that the relevant entropy is in general larger at the time t than at
the initial time t0 means that a part of our initial information on the set Aˆi
has leaked at the time t towards irrelevant variables. This loss of relevant
information characterizes a dissipation in the evolution of the variables Ai (t).
The construction of section 5 associates, at each time, a reduced density oper-
ator DˆR (t) with the set of relevant variables Ai (t). As regards these variables,
DˆR (t) is equivalent to Dˆ (t) :
Tr DˆR (t) Aˆi = Tr Dˆ (t) Aˆi = Ai (t) , (13)
but it has the maximum entropy form (6) and thus does not retain information
about the irrelevant variables. It is parameterized by the set of multipliers
γi (t), in one-to-one correspondence with the set of relevant variables Ai (t).
Regarding density operators as points in a vector space, we can visualize (fig.
1) the correspondence from Dˆ (t) to DˆR (t) as a projection onto the manifold R of
reduced states (6). (The space of states Dˆ can be endowed with a natural metric
(Balian et al, 1986) defined by ds2 = −d2S = Tr dDˆ d ln Dˆ; the correspondence
Dˆ → DˆR then appears as an orthogonal projection.) We thus consider in
parallel two time-dependent descriptions of the system, the most detailed one
by Dˆ (t) which accounts for all observables, and the less detailed one by DˆR (t),
or equivalently by the set γi (t), which accounts for the variables Ai (t) only, and
is sufficient for our purpose.
Rather than following the motion of Dˆ (t) which involves all the complicated
irrelevant variables, we wish to eliminate these variables, i.e., to follow the
motion of DˆR (t) on the surface R. We thus wish to project the Liouville–
von Neumann trajectory of Dˆ (t) onto R. Once the operators Dˆ are regarded as
elements of the vector space of states, it is natural to regard the operators Aˆ as
elements of the dual vector space, the space of observables, the scalar product
being defined by (1) and noted as
(Aˆ;Dˆ) ≡ Tr AˆDˆ =
〈
Aˆ
〉
Dˆ
. (14)
Linear transformations in either vector spaces
{
Dˆ
}
or
{
Aˆ
}
are represented by
“superoperators” acting either on their right or their left side. In particular the
equation of motion (2) can be rewritten as
dDˆ
dt
= LDˆ , (15)
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Figure 1: The reduction of the description. A state Dˆ of quantum statistical physics
is represented by a point in a vector space. Here the first two axes schematize the
relevant variables Ai = Tr AˆiDˆ, regarded as coordinates of Dˆ, while the third axis
stands for its many irrelevant coordinates. The trajectory of Dˆ (t) is governed by the
Liouville–von Neumann equation (2). The reduced state DˆR (t), equivalent to Dˆ (t)
as regards the relevant variables {Ai} but maximizing the von Neumann entropy,
is the intersection of the plane Ai (t) = Tr AˆiDˆ (represented here as a line) and
the surface R parameterized by the set {γi} according to (6), (8). The trajectory
of DˆR (t) is obtained by projecting that of Dˆ (t) on R. It starts from the initial
point DˆR (t0) = Dˆ (t0) and is governed by eq.(17) or its approximation (21). The
von Neumann entropy is constant along the line Dˆ (t), whereas for DˆR (t) information
is lost towards the irrelevant degrees of freedom.
in terms of the Liouvillian superoperator which transforms Dˆ into LDˆ ≡[
Hˆ, Dˆ
]
/i~ . The projection from Dˆ to DˆR = PDˆ is implemented by means of
the projection superoperator
P = DˆR ⊗ Iˆ +
∂DˆR
∂Ai
⊗
(
Aˆi −AiIˆ
)
, (16)
where DˆR, expressed by (6), is regarded as a function of the set γi directly and
through Ψ, and hence as a function of the set Ai through (11). A superoperator
which is a tensor product Aˆ⊗Bˆ of operators acts on Cˆ as AˆTr
(
BˆCˆ
)
on the right
side and as Tr
(
CˆAˆ
)
Bˆ on the left side. Applied on the right side, P leaves DˆR
and its first-order derivatives ∂DˆR/∂γi or ∂DˆR/∂Ai invariant. Applied on the
left side, it leaves the operators Aˆi and Iˆ invariant. We note the complementary
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projection superoperator on the irrelevant subspace as Q = J − P where J
is the unit superoperator. We can then replace (15), using (16), by coupled
equations for the two projected states, DˆR = PDˆ, which depends on time
through Dˆ and P , and QDˆ. The elimination of the irrelevant variables is then
achieved, explicitly though formally, by eliminating QDˆ.
We thus find an integro-differential equation of the form
dDˆR
dt
= PLDˆR +
∫ t
t0
dt′M (t, t′) DˆR (t
′) , (17)
which involves a memory kernel
M (t, t′) = P (t)L W (t, t′)LP (t′) (18)
acting in the time-dependent relevant space. This kernel depends on the evolu-
tion superoperator W in the irrelevant space, itself defined by[
d
dt
−Q (t)L
]
W (t, t′) = Q (t) δ (t− t′) . (19)
Eq. (17) is equivalent to the equation of motion for the relevant variables
Ai (t) = (Aˆi;Dˆ (t) ) = (Aˆi;DˆR (t) ), namely :
dAi
dt
= (Aˆi;PLDˆR)+
∫ t
t0
dt′(Aˆi;M (t, t
′) DˆR (t
′) ) , (20)
or for their conjugate set γi (t). The first term describes the direct coupling
between relevant observables. The second one, which results from their indirect
coupling through the irrelevant ones, is a retarded, memory effect depending on
the past history of the Ai’s.
We have already shown that, between the times t0 and t, some information
about the relevant variables is transferred towards the irrelevant ones, which
keep memory of the initial conditions. This transfer of information is measured
by (12). The dissipation, that is, the time-derivative of the relevant entropy, is
obtained from (2), (6), (17) as
dSR
dt
=
∑
i
γi (t)
∫ t
t0
dt′(Aˆi;M (t, t
′) DˆR (t
′) ) . (21)
It is a retardation effect, associated with the history of the coupling with the
irrelevant observables. (The first term of (17) does not contribute.)
Till now, we have kept the relevant observables Aˆi arbitrary. Although exact,
the equation (20) is in general unworkable due to retardation. If we wish to use
it in practice, we should make a suitable choice of the set Aˆi. Suppose this
choice implies that the memory time over which M (t, t′) is sizeable is short
compared to the characteristic times of the set Ai (t). This property occurs if
(18) involves very many irrelevant degrees of freedom which evolve rapidly and
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interfere destructively. We can then replace DˆR (t
′) by DˆR (t) and t0 by −∞ in
(17). In this approximation the evolution of the relevant variables is governed
by a mere differential equation at the time t
dDˆR
dt
≃ PLDˆR +KDˆR , (22)
where the dissipative kernel K is defined by
K (t) =
∫ t
−∞
dt′M (t, t′) . (23)
In this short-memory approximation, the dissipation (21) reduces to
dSR
dt
=
∑
i
γi(Aˆi;KDR) . (24)
Although SR (t) > SR (t0), nothing prevents (21) to be negative at some times
for an arbitrary choice of the set Aˆi; at such times, relevant information (or
order) which had previously been transferred to the irrelevant set and memorized
there is recovered. Such a phenomenon indicates that the relevant variables
have not been properly selected since they are sensitive to memory stored in the
discarded variables.
However, if the short-memory approximation (22) holds, the relevant infor-
mation is irretrievably lost : the dissipation rate (24) is positive. We understand
this fact by noting that DˆR (t) depends only on DˆR (t−∆t) if the time-scale
∆t characterizing the variations of DˆR or SR in (22) or (24) can be treated as
infinitesimal, but is large compared to the memory time of M (t, t′); the much
earlier initial condition DˆR (t0) is forgotten. Taking then t as the initial time in
eq. (12), we find SR (t) ≥ SR (t−∆t) as anticipated. This entropy production
measures a continuous flow of order or of information from the relevant to the
irrelevant variables, which is generated by the evolution of the system.
Altogether, if we choose the set of relevant observables Aˆi in such a way
that the memory time associated with the dynamics of the irrelevant variables
through M (t, t′) is much shorter than the time scales associated with the mo-
tion of the relevant variables Ai (t), the latter variables evolve autonomously.
They obey the Markovian equation (22), and the associated entropy (24) in-
creases. The quasi-instantaneous kernel K accounts for the dissipative effects
induced on the variables Ai (t) by the eliminated ones. An adequate choice of
observables Aˆi, for which equations of motion of the form (22) involving through
K a negligible memory time are valid within a given precision, is thus not left
to us. It is imposed by the microscopic dynamics through the possibility of sep-
arating the time scales of Ai (t) and M (t, t′). this criterion does not depend
on the observers, but only on the microscopic Hamiltonian and the considered
conditions. For finite systems, eq. (22) still keeps a subjective aspect even if
the short-memory approximation is justified, because it deals with probabilities
or equivalently with variables Ai (t) that are expectation values. However, for
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large systems, when statistical fluctuations are negligible, the equations of mo-
tion for the set Ai (t) reach an objective status and can describe an individual
system, in the same way as the equilibrium properties in thermodynamics (end
of section 6). In such a situation, the increase of relevant entropy measured by
the dissipation rate (24) also becomes independent of the observers, although
it is microscopically interpreted as a loss of information. It quantifies the fact
that the irrelevant variables act only through the quasi-instantaneous kernel K,
and that nothing is stored in them that could flow back towards the relevant
set within any reasonable delay.
Many semi-phenomenological approaches can be recovered frommicrophysics
through the above elimination of a set of irrelevant variables that produce no
memory effects on the relevant ones. We discuss two examples in sections 8 and
9.
8 Thermodynamics of irreversible processes
Section 6 was devoted to what is usually referred to as “thermodynamics”, but
should rather be called “thermostatics” since its Laws apply to the compari-
son of initial and the final state, not to the process itself which leads from one
to the other. Thermodynamics proper provides the general laws that govern
the time-dependence of the macroscopic variables, in compound systems of the
type described at the beginning of section 6. These laws pertain to the ther-
modynamic regime, which must be sufficiently slow so that the variables Ai (t)
that characterize the macroscopic state at each time are the same conservative
local variables as in section 6. However, the subsystems may now be volume
elements, treated as infinitesimal but sufficiently large so that each one remains
nearly at equilibrium at any time. Thus the variables Ai include the energies
of the subsystems (or the energy density ρE (r) in each volume element) for
thermal processes; they include the numbers of constitutive particles (or their
local density ρN (r)) for diffusive or chemical processes. They also include the
density of momentum ρP (r) in hydrodynamics.
The equations of motion of thermodynamics couple the time-derivatives of
the conservative variables Ai to their fluxes, which in turn are related to the
gradients of the intensive variables (defined as in the end of section 6). They
describe phenomena such as relaxation or transport, in physics, mechanics or
chemistry. The time-scales associated with this set of macroscopic equations are
large compared to the time-scales over which the subsystems reach equilibrium.
Indeed, owing to their conservative nature, the variables Ai can change only if a
transfer occurs from one subsystem to another, and the couplings which govern
such transfers are weak compared to the interactions within each subsystem
which ensure local equilibrium.
Hence, in the thermodynamic regime, the relevant variables of microscopic
statistical physics should be identified with the above thermodynamic variables
Ai. In the projected equations (20) that they obey, there is a clear separation
of time scales and the short-memory approximation (22), (23) is valid. The
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resulting coupled instantaneous equations for the set Ai can then be identified
with the phenomenological equations of thermodynamics.
Since the relevant observables Aˆi are the same as in section 6, their associated
relevant entropy SR (Ai) is again identified with the thermodynamic entropy
Sth (Ai); its partial derivatives are related to the local intensive variables such
as the local temperature, chemical potential or hydrodynamic velocity. Its rate
of change, given by statistical physics as (24), is positive. This property is
identified with the macroscopic Clausius–Duhem inequality dSth/dt ≥ 0, which
can therefore be interpreted microscopically as the fact that some amount of
information, or some order attached to the conservative variables is continuously
lost during a dissipative thermodynamic process towards the non-conservative
variables.
9 Boltzmann gas
The first historic appearance of statistical mechanics was the kinetic theory
of dilute gases. In Boltzmann’s approach, the state of the gas is represented
at each time by the density of particles f (r,p, t) in the 6-dimensional single-
particle phase space. Its evolution is governed by the semi phenomenological
Boltzmann equation
∂f
∂t
+
p
m
· ∇rf = J (f) , (25)
the right side of which is the collision integral. It is local in space and time.
Boltzmann’s description should be regarded as macroscopic. Indeed, in or-
der to describe at the microscopic scale a dilute gas, we should use the classical
limit of quantum statistical mechanics. We indicated in section 2 that the
probabilistic state is then represented by the density D in the 6N -dimensional
phase space, which encompasses not only f (r,p) but also the 2-particle, ..., N -
particle correlation functions in the single-particle phase space. Their evolution
is governed by the equations of the BBGKY hierarchy, which are equivalent
to the Liouville equation (the classical limit of (2)) and which, in contrast to
Boltzmann’s equation (25), are invariant under time-reversal. Let us identify
f (r,p, t) with our relevant set of variables Ai, the index i standing here for a
point r, p in phase space. Following the procedure of section 7, we can eliminate
formally all the irrelevant variables, that is, all the correlations between parti-
cles. The BBGKY hierarchy then gives rise to an integro-differential equation of
the type (20) for f (r,p, t). However, in a dilute gas, the memory time entering
the kernel W , which describes the variations in time of the correlations, is the
duration of a collision, since correlations are created by two-particle collisions.
This duration is much shorter than the time between two successive collisions
of a particle, which governs the evolution of f (r,p, t). Likewise, the size of the
particles is much smaller than the mean free path. The short-memory approxi-
mation is justified by this neat separation of scales. It leads on the macroscopic
time-scale to an instantaneous and local equation for f (r,p, t) of the type (22),
which is identified with the Boltzmann equation (25).
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The relevant entropy SB associated with the reduced Boltzmann description,
in terms of the single-particle density f (r,p, t), is readily found by noting that
DR factorizes as a product of identical contributions from each particle and that
the classical limit of a trace is an integral over phase space. We then get at each
time
SB ≡ SR (f) = h
−3
∫
d3r d3p f (r,p)
[
1− lnh3 f (r,p)
]
. (26)
We recognize that this single-particle entropy is directly related to Boltzmann’s
H-functional, H ≡
∫
f ln f , within a sign and within additive and multiplica-
tive constants. Thus, Boltzmann’s H-theorem, which expresses that H does
not increase when f evolves according to Boltzmann’s equation (25), is now
interpreted as a continuous transfer of information from the single-particle data
f (r,p) to correlations which are built up by each collision. In this process,
S (D) remains constant, expressing that no information would have been lost if
we had been able to deal with the full BBGKY hierarchy, including correlations
between a very large number of particles.
Boltzmann’s reduced description in terms of f (r,p) is more detailed than the
hydrodynamic or thermodynamic description of the gas in terms of the densities
ρN (r), ρP (r), ρE (r) of the conserved quantities (particle number, momentum,
energy). It depends at each time on one function f of six variables rather than on
five functions ρ of three variables, which are obtained from f (r,p) by integration
over p with weights 1, p and p2/2m, respectively. Boltzmann’s description thus
remains valid in circumstances where the hydrodynamic description fails, such
as shock waves and boundary layers where space variations are so rapid that
local equilibrium does not exist, or very dilute gases in ballistic regimes where
collisions are too rare to ensure thermalization.
Accordingly, Boltzmann’s entropy SB defined by (26) should not be confused
with the thermodynamic entropy Sth, which for a gas is a function of the ρ’s
given by the Sackur–Tetrode formula. Nor should the H-theorem for SB be
confused with the Second Law or with the Clausius–Duhem inequality for Sth.
The latter is valid in the local equilibrium regime only (but for any material, in
contrast to the H-theorem). For dilute gases in the ballistic regime, only SB is
relevant, Sth is useless.
Since Boltzmann’s description is less reduced than the hydrodynamic one,
SB is in general smaller than Sth. Actually, maximization of (26) under local
constraints on ρN , ρP and ρE provides for f (r,p) a Maxwellian form, i.e.,
ln f (r,p) is a linear function of p and p2/2m describing local equilibrium. When
a gas is enclosed in a vessel, its irreversible evolution, which is governed by
(25), leads it in a first stage to a state close to local equilibrium; Boltzmann’s
entropy SB increases and eventually reaches Sth. Information is thus lost, not
only towards the correlations which are not observed, but also through the
evolution of f (r,p) towards a maximum entropy Maxwellian form. In the
second stage, after the local equilibrium regime is reached, the collision term
in (25) is dominated by the small deviation of f (r,p) from this form. The
Chapman–Enskog method, based on the elimination of this deviation (which
is formally similar to the elimination of QDˆR that leads to (17) then to (22)),
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then provides the thermodynamic equations for the gas (Fourier and Navier–
Stokes equations) as consequences of the Boltzmann equation. In this regime
the two descriptions become equivalent; SB and Sth, which remain nearly equal,
both increase towards the global equilibrium entropy. The information which is
being lost during this second process is the one associated with non-uniformity
in space of the densities ρ.
10 Irreversibility and the multiplicity of entro-
pies
The discussion of section 7 and the two examples of sections 8 and 9 eluci-
date the paradox of irreversibility, stated at the end of the XIXth century by
Loschmidt, Zermelo and Poincare´: How can the reversible Liouville–von Neu-
mann equations of motion, which underlie the behaviour of any system, give rise
to the irreversible evolutions that we observe at our scale? The answer is based
on information theory. Macroscopic objects are so complex at the microscopic
scale that we can control or observe only an extremely tiny proportion of the
entire set of variables. These experimental variables are part of a set Ai, the
set of relevant variables, that we may theoretically handle (the thermodynamic
densities ρ in section 8, the single-particle density f in section 9). Irreversibility
is then associated with an irretrievable leak of information (or of order) from
the set Ai towards the irrelevant variables, extremely numerous and completely
out of reach. The time-derivative of the relevant entropy SR (Ai) measures this
rate of dissipation.
The fact that order which is lost for us within the irrelevant degrees of free-
dom never returns to the relevant set is a consequence of the occurrence of two
time scales in the microscopic dynamics. The short memory-time of the ker-
nel M in (20) is associated with the very large number of irrelevant variables
and with the destructive interference of their evolutions. The longer time-scale
which characterizes the motion of the relevant set Ai, including the experimen-
tally accessible variables, is associated with some specificities of the dynamics:
local conservation laws for the thermodynamic regime, large ratio between the
interparticle distance and the range of forces for gases in the ballistic regime.
This separation of time scales provides, within a good approximation, instanta-
neous equations (22) for the relevant set which, in contrast to the microscopic
equations, are non-linear and irreversible. It should be stressed that the short
memory in the exact equation (20) is sufficient to ensure dissipation, and that
the huge number of irrelevant variables also implies that the Poincare´ recurrence
time is large beyond any imagination. Moreover, we have seen that, although
the underlying concepts of probability, expectation value and information have
a subjective nature, the resulting properties for the variables Ai (t) and for the
relevant entropy SR (t) become objective, depending only on the system in hand
when this system is macroscopic.
Irreversibility, when analyzed at the microscopic scale, is a statistical phe-
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nomenon. We have seen that probabilities underlie the very idea of information,
a loss of which is identified with dissipation. An individual trajectory in clas-
sical mechanics, a time-dependent pure state in quantum mechanics, cannot
display irreversibility, since they encompass all the degrees of freedom. Boltz-
mann already recognized this fact in kinetic theory, when he stressed the idea
that, even when one considers a single trajectory in the 6N -dimensional phase
space, its initial point should be regarded as a typical configuration belonging
to some ensemble of macroscopically similar configurations. The logarithm of
the number of these configurations is the initial entropy. The final point of the
trajectory is likewise a typical configuration of a much larger set, all elements of
which describe equilibrium configurations. The larger size of this set provides a
quantitative interpretation of the entropy increase.
Regarding the relevant entropy as missing information has led us to assign to
a given process several entropies, associated with different levels of description.
For a gas we have thus characterized in section 9 the coarseness of the most
detailed description, of the Boltzmann description and of the thermodynamic
description by the von Neumann entropy, the Boltzmann entropy and the ther-
modynamic entropy, respectively. In order to understand better the mechanism
which gives rise to the irreversibility of the dynamics of a classical gas, we can in-
troduce a set of nested reduced descriptions (Mayer and Mayer, 1977). We start
from the complete description in terms of the density D in the 6N -dimensional
phase space, which obeys the Liouville equation. The n-th reduced description
is defined by dropping all information contained in the correlations of more than
n particles. Boltzmann’s description is the first reduced description; the second
one accounts for the two-particle correlations created by the collisions, but not
for the higher order correlations; and so on. At each level, there are reduced
equations of motion resulting from the BBGKY set. The associated hierarchy of
relevant entropies S1 ≡ SB, S2, . . . , Sn, . . . , SN ≡ S (D) satisfy the inequalities
Seq ≥ Sth ≥ S1 ≥ S2 ≥ . . . ≥ Sn ≥ . . . ≥ S (D) , (27)
which express an increasing content of information. Their time-dependence,
qualitatively shown in fig. 2, reflects the cascade through which correlations of
more and more particles are created by successive collisions. Since two parti-
cles that have already undergone a collision have little chance to collide again
for large N , due to the fact that the mean free path is much longer than the
interparticle distance, information flows out from f (r,p) first to 2-particle cor-
relations, then from 2-particle to 3-particle correlations, and so on.
Figure 2 also exhibits a non-uniform convergence. If N is fixed, Sn tends to
the constant S (D) at any time when n increases so as to reach N . However,
under physical conditions, we have always N ≫ n, even if we let n ≫ 1. In
this case, Sn tends for any fixed n and for long times to the equilibrium entropy
Seq. Thus, the amount of order Seq−S (D) which is in excess in the initial non-
equilibrium state is eventually dissipated within the correlations of an infinite
number of particles. This property is consistent with the way D (t) converges
for large t towards the equilibrium state Deq of a perfect gas. Actually, for finite
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Figure 2: Hierarchy of entropies in a gas. Larger and larger entropies are asso-
ciated with less and less detailed descriptions. The entropy S (D) of the complete
description remains constant for an isolated system. If the initial state is uncorre-
lated, Boltzmann’s entropy S1 increases (H-theorem) from S (D) to the equilibrium
thermostatic entropy Seq, evaluated for the initial values of the energy, particle number
and density of the gas. It is smaller than the thermodynamic entropy Sth, a function of
the local densities of energy, particles and momentum, but both remain nearly equal
after the distribution f (r,p, t) has become Maxwellian (local equilibrium regime).
The entropies S2, S3 · · ·Sn accounting for 2-, 3-,· · ·n-particle correlations evolve like
S1; they are at each time smaller and smaller with n and increase later and later.
N , D (t) cannot reach Deq since their entropies differ. However, if N is made
large first, D (t) becomes equivalent for large t to Deq as regards f (r,p) (a
Maxwellian distribution) and as regards all the correlations of a finite number
n of particles (these correlations are negligible).
Note that the entropies of the above hierarchy are purely theoretical objects.
The only ones that experiments may reach, more or less indirectly, are SB, Sth
and Seq, depending on the circumstances.
11 Spin echoes
Let us return to the paradox of irreversibility. Consider a gas, enclosed in a
vessel and prepared at the initial time t0 = 0 in an off-equilibrium state (for
instance with a non-uniform density). At the time τ , it has reached equilibrium.
If we were able to reverse suddenly the velocities of all the particles, we would
recover the initial state at the time 2τ . Such a violation of the arrow of time
in thermodynamics cannot be experimentally achieved, because the needed in-
version of the individual velocities is not feasible. Anyhow, since the number
of microscopic configurations associated with the initial non-equilibrium state
is enormously smaller than the number of those associated with the final equi-
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librium state, the above hypothetical reversal of velocities should be performed
rigorously, which is unthinkable; a small deviation would lead at the final time
2τ to a configuration having equilibrium features at the macroscopic scale, in
contrast to the initial off-equilibrium configuration.
Nevertheless, similar paradoxical evolutions which violate at a macroscopic
scale the laws of thermodynamics have been built up, through subtle experi-
ments of nuclear magnetism (Abragam and Goldman, 1982). The nuclear spins
sˆi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N), the value s of which is a half-integer, lie in an external
magnetic field permanently applied along the z-axis. They undergo a Larmor
precession around this axis with angular frequency ω0 along z and proportional
to the field. The only quantities that can be observed in practice are the com-
ponents of the total magnetic moment M (t), equal in dimensionless units to
the expectation value over the density operator Dˆ (t) of the total spin
Mˆ ≡
∑
i
sˆi . (28)
One can act on the system only by means of time-dependent external fields cou-
pled to Mˆ. One thus handles simultaneously all the spins, which globally rotate.
In particular, application at time t of a brief magnetic pulse along some axis
during a controlled delay allows one to suddenly perform any overall rotation,
with a given angle Ω around a given direction Ω/Ω. This pulse modifies the
density operator Dˆ (t) into UˆD (t) Uˆ †, where Uˆ = exp
(
iΩ · Mˆ
)
is the unitary
transformation describing the considered rotation.
The Hamiltonian has the following form
Hˆ = ~ω0 Mˆz +
∑
i
~δωi · sˆi + Vˆss + Vˆsl . (29)
Its first term generates the Larmor precession dM/dt = ω0×M around z. The
next terms are responsible for three different mechanisms of relaxation of M.
(i) The applied field is not quite uniform. Each spin 〈ˆsi〉, depending on its
location, undergoes a Larmor precession with angular frequency ω0 + δωi. If
all the spins 〈ˆsi〉 lie initially along the x-axis, they precess at different speeds,
nearly in the xy-plane, and thus get graduately out of phase. Hence their sum
M (t) spirals down to zero in the vicinity of the xy-plane. If we denote as δ
the statistical fluctuation of δωiz (the average over i of which vanishes) the
relaxation time for this process is 1/δ.
(ii) The spin-spin contribution Vˆss to (29) is the sum of the two-body dipolar
interactions. Under the experimental conditions where ω0 is sufficiently large,
the part of Vˆss which does not commute with Mˆz is ineffective. These pairwise
interactions play for the spins the same role as the interparticle interactions for
a gas. A “flip-flop” process, which changes the configuration ↑↓ of a pair into
↓↑, is the equivalent of a collision, which changes the momenta of two particles
in a gas. This mechanism gradually creates correlations between two, then
three spins, and so on. By a process similar to the one described at the end of
section 10, the state of the N -spin system thus tends to a maximum entropy
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Boltzmann–Gibbs distribution Dˆeq ∝ exp
(
−βHˆ
)
, apart from invisible many-
spin correlations. The spin temperature 1/β depends only on the initial energy
of the spins. The relaxation time for this process is traditionally denoted as T2.
(iii) The spin-lattice contribution Vˆsl to (29) couples the nuclear spins to
the other degrees of freedom (the “lattice”), such as the phonons in a solid. It
tends to thermalize the nuclear spins, imposing them the lattice temperature.
Its associated relaxation time T1 is much longer than the duration of the spin
echo experiments, owing to the weakness of the coupling between the nuclear
spins and the other variables of the material. We shall thus disregard this term.
The oldest type of spin echoes was discovered by Hahn soon after the birth
of nuclear magnetic resonance. Such spin echo experiments are performed on
liquids, the disorder of which smoothes out the interactions Vˆss. The Hamilto-
nian thus reduces to the first two Zeeman terms of (29). One starts from an
equilibrium state, at a sufficiently low temperature so that all spins are prac-
tically oriented along z. By a pulse pi/2 applied along y just before the time
t0 = 0, one generates an off-equilibrium pure initial state Dˆ (0) with magne-
tization Mx (0) having the largest possible value Ns, and My = Mz = 0. As
indicated above under (i), the magnetization M (t) relaxes under the effect of
the heterogeneity of the field. After a number of turns larger than ω0/δ, at some
time τ larger than 1/δ (but smaller than T2 and T1), all three components ofM
have reached 0. If we imagine we have followed the motion at the microscopic
scale, the state Dˆ (t) has remained pure: each one of the N vectors 〈ˆsi〉 has
kept the maximum length s; its component along z is negligible as δ/ω0, while
it points out in some direction in the xy-plane. This direction is determined by
the local magnetic field, i.e., by δωiz . Nothing seems to distinguish this state
from the reduced state DˆR which describes thermodynamic equilibrium at large
temperature. While the entropy S
(
Dˆ
)
has kept its initial value 0, the rele-
vant entropy S
(
DˆR
)
= SR (M = 0) associated with M has reached the largest
possible value N ln (2s+ 1). The system seems “dead” since only M = 0 is
observed in practice.
However, superimposed to the permanent magnetic field, a pulse pi along
x is applied at the time τ . The components 〈sˆix〉, 〈sˆiy〉, and 〈sˆiz〉 ≃ 0 are
quasi suddenly changed by the corresponding unitary transformation into 〈sˆix〉,
−〈sˆiy〉, and −〈sˆiz〉 ≃ 0. Hence, the spins which precess faster than the average
Larmor flow because δωiz > 0, and which were therefore ahead at the time
τ by some angle, are now behind at the time τ + 0 by just the same angle.
Likewise, the spins that precess slower have been brought forward by the pulse.
Hence, after a second time lapse τ , during which the precession goes on with the
same local frequency, all the spins reach the initial direction along x, and the
total magnetization M returns to its largest possible value Ns at the time 2τ .
Between the times τ and 2τ , the initial order has progressively been recovered,
the relevant entropy SR (M) has decreased from N ln (2s+ 1) to 0. A single
macroscopic manipulation, the application of the pulse pi along x at τ , has been
sufficient to produce an evolution which violates the thermodynamic surmise, as
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would have done the unfeasible reversal of velocities for a gas. This paradoxical
evolution can be understood only by keeping track of all the microscopic spin
degrees of freedom.
In this spin echo experiment, the order about M, lost between the time
0 and τ and recovered between τ and 2τ , is associated with the correlation
for each spin, which during the motion is established between the direction
of the vector 〈ˆsi〉 in the xy-plane and the value δωiz of the z-component of
the local magnetic field. The very large number ω0τ/~ of revolutions of the
spins that take place during the time τ produces a configuration of directions
of spins 〈sˆi〉 which seems to be just a sample picked up at random within the
truly dead ensemble DˆR describing equilibrium. Even if we are given the full
available information, to wit, the seemingly dead density operator Dˆ (τ) issued
from Dˆ (0) and the Hamiltonian Hˆ that generated the evolution, we would
have an extreme difficulty to uncover, among this huge amount of data, the
crucial correlations between 〈ˆsi〉 and δωiz . Our situation is the same as that of
the audience of a conjuring show, who are unable to detect how the shuffling
process has retained some hidden order in a pack of cards. The experimentalist
has also the same pieces of information, Dˆ (τ) and Hˆ , but like the conjurer he
acknowledges therein that the directions of the 〈ˆsi〉’s are not random but are
correlated with the δωiz ’s. Indeed, he is aware of the initial conditions and of the
history of the system which destroyed the visible order, an information which is
equivalent to the knowledge of the correlations between D (τ) and Hˆ , but easier
to analyse. Relying on this knowledge, he is able to bring back the order buried
in these correlations into the simple macroscopic degrees of freedom M.
He succeeds in this task owing to a specificity of the motion: it is two-
dimensional except during a pulse, and we can see that the rotation Uˆ around
the x-axis has an effect akin to a time reversal. Indeed, noting that the final state
is invariant under the rotation Uˆ = Uˆ † around x, we can write the evolution
operator between the times 0 and 2τ as
Uˆ † exp
(
−iHˆτ/~
)
Uˆ exp
(
−iHˆτ/~
)
= exp
(
−iUˆ †HˆUˆτ/~
)
exp
(
−iHˆτ/~
)
.
(30)
Since the components ωix of the field have little effect, we can write
Uˆ †HˆUˆ ≃ −Hˆ . (31)
This change of sign has the same effect as a time-reversal taking place during
the second part of the process, which therefore brings us back to the initial
states at the time 2τ .
After the time 2τ , the evolution is exactly the same as after the initial
time 0 and M (t) returns to zero. The operation can then be iterated, and the
measurement of the length of M (t) provides a sequence of peaks. Their height
slowly decreases due to the other relaxation mechanisms that we have neglected
on the time scale 1/δ. Spin echoes have thus become a current technique in
nuclear magnetic resonance to determine relaxation times with precision and
thus explore matter.
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At the epoch of their discovery, these spin echoes were regarded as some-
what miraculous since they violated thermodynamics: They appeared as an
exceptional macroscopic phenomenon that can be explained only through the
microscopic dynamics. Full knowledge of Dˆ (τ) and of Hˆ is needed here, whereas
the thermodynamic phenomena can be described in terms of the reduced state
Dˆth and of Hˆ only. We may, however, argue that the order which is retrieved was
not very deeply hidden. It lay at the time τ in the rather trivial set of correla-
tions between the orientation of each spin and the size of the corresponding local
field. It is natural to think that the relaxation induced by the spin-spin interac-
tions should in actual fact be incurable, in the same way as the collision-induced
relaxation in a gas. Nevertheless, quite surprisingly, spin-echo experiments of
a different type have been performed, in which the “death” of spins (M → 0)
caused after the relaxation time T2 by the term Vˆss of (29) is followed by their
“resurrection” (Abragam and Goldman, 1982). We only sketch here the ba-
sic ideas. The considered experiments are performed on solids, for which Vˆss
is significant. The applied field is sufficiently uniform so that the duration of
the experiment is much shorter than 1/δ. The Hamiltonian (29) can therefore
be simplified into Hˆ = ~ω0Mˆz + Vˆss. The experiment begins as in Hahn’s spin
echoes by the preparation of an initial state withMx = Ns,My =Mz = 0, then
during the Larmor precession by its decay, taking now place under the effect of
Vˆss. At a time τ larger than T2, the magnetization is lost as above, but now the
relaxation has taken place (as in the case of gases) through a cascade of flip-flop
transitions involving more and more spins. The initial order has dissolved into
complicated many-spin correlations, and the density operator
Dˆ (τ) = e−iHˆτ/~Dˆ (0) eiHˆτ/~ (32)
is equivalent, as regards observables involving a finite number of spins, to a
“dead” equilibrium state with large temperature.
After the time τ , a sequence of suitably chosen brief pulses and lasting time-
dependent fields referred to as a “magic sandwich”, is applied for a duration
τ ′. Thus, during this period, the Hamiltonian becomes Hˆ + ~ω (t) · Mˆ where
ω (t) is proportional to the time-dependent applied field. The remarkable fact is
the possibility of choosing ω (t) in such a way that the unitary operator which
describes the evolution between the times τ and τ + τ ′ has approximately the
form
T exp
{
−i
∫ τ+τ ′
τ
dt
[
Hˆ/~+ ω (t) · Mˆ
]}
≃ exp
[
iλHˆτ ′/~
]
(33)
(T denotes time-ordering). The coefficient λ is positive, so that, as in eqs.
(30) (31), the effect of the magic sandwich ω (t) is to replace τ ′ by −λτ ′, thus
changing effectively the arrow of time in the considered interval. The actual re-
alization of eq. (33) has needed great ingenuity, because the dipolar interactions
contained in Hˆ involve pairwise interactions whereas the external operations are
represented by a mere field coupled to Mˆ only.
As an example, in one of the experiments performed, ω (t) in (33) describes
a magic sandwich consisting of three successive operations: (i) at the time τ ,
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a pulse pi/2 along y is exerted, represented by the operator U ; (ii) between the
times τ and τ + τ ′, a radiofrequency field along x, with a frequency ω0 and an
intensity ~ω′ is applied; in the Larmor rotating frame, it provides a contribution
~ω′Mˆx to the Hamiltonian; (iii) at the time τ + τ
′ a pulse −pi/2 is applied along
y. The evolution operator (33), written in the rotating frame, is thus
Uˆ † exp
[
−i
(
Vˆss/~+ ω
′Mˆx
)
τ ′
]
Uˆ = exp
(
−iUˆ †VˆssUˆτ
′/~− iω′Mˆzτ
′
)
. (34)
If ω′ is sufficiently large, the part of Uˆ †VˆssUˆ which does not commute with Mz
is negligible, and one finds
Uˆ †VˆssUˆ ≃ −
1
2
Vˆss , (35)
which replaces here (31). The last term in (34) amounts to a trivial Larmor
rotation. Thus (33) is satisfied (in the rotating frame) with λ = 12 .
After the time τ+τ ′ the evolution is again governed by the sole Hamiltonian
Hˆ. Hence, provided τ ′ is larger than τ/λ, we can introduce a delay τ ′′ such
that τ − λτ ′ + τ ′′ = 0, for which the full evolution operator from t = 0 to
t = τ + τ ′ + τ ′′, found from (32) and (33) is nearly the unit operator. The
magnetization M (τ + τ ′ + τ ′′) thus returns to its initial value M (0) although
it had previously decayed to zero during the time τ . Here again the arrow of
time is challenged.
The features of this process are the same as in Hahn’s echoes, in particular
the recovery of hidden order and the need for explaining this phenomenon to
rely on all the microscopic degrees of freedom, although the observations and
the manipulations concern only the macroscopic quantities M. However, here,
the order that is experimentally retrieved had been transferred by the evolution
towards extremely complicated correlations of large numbers of spins, and the
initial decay seemed genuinely irreversible as in the case of a gas. Indeed, for
nearly all experiments which can be realized in practice, the state Dˆ (τ) which
involves these special correlations keeping memory of Dˆ (0) gives the same pre-
dictions as the reduced equilibrium state DˆR. Nevertheless, the magic sandwich
manipulation, which is rather tricky, transforms back these special correlations
of Dˆ (τ) into the initial order restored in Dˆ (τ + τ ′ + τ ′′). The magic sandwich
experiments achieve, for spins, the analogue of the hypothetical reversal of ve-
locities for a gas; quite remarkably, it is simply the application of some special
uniform time-dependent magnetic fields which overcomes here the apparent dis-
order generated by the interactions.
12 Conclusion
An analysis of various physical processes where we made use of the informa-
tion concept has led us to stress the relative nature of entropy, identified with
missing information. Depending on the circumstances, macroscopic phenomena
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should be described in terms of different sets of relevant variables. Different as-
sociated entropies are thus introduced, even for the same system. The entropy
of thermodynamics is only one of them.
Dissipation, which is also relative, is measured by the increase of some rel-
evant entropy. It characterizes the irreversibility of a macroscopic process, and
can be interpreted as an irretrievable leak of information towards inaccessible
degrees of freedom. Since information, as well as probability, is a concept as-
sociated with the knowledge of observers about an object rather than with the
object in itself, thermodynamic notions such as entropy and dissipation have at
the microscopic level a subjective aspect.
This subjective character is exemplified by the spin-echo experiments, which
show that irreversibility itself is relative. In such circumstances the loss of
memory which accompanies an irreversibility may be overcome and a hidden
order, which keeps track of the initial state, may come into view.
However, in less exotic circumstances, for instance, for systems displaying
a collective motion or for materials that can be described by thermodynamics,
it is possible to select among the huge set of microscopic variables some subset
of relevant variables which obey autonomous equations of motion. The lat-
ter dynamical equations are often identified with phenomenological equations.
Their establishment from microphysics involves approximations, such as the
short-memory approximation, but they can hold with a high precision if there
is a clear-cut separation of time-scales which allows the elimination of irrele-
vant variables. The existence of these variables manifests itself through quasi-
instantaneous dissipative effects. Such a reduction of the description brings in
new features, which differ qualitatively from those of microphysics, especially
for macroscopic systems: continuity and extensivity of matter at our scale, ir-
reversibility and non-linearity of the equations of motion, existence of phase
transitions, enormous variety of behaviours in spite of the simplicity of the ele-
mentary constituents and in spite of the unicity of the microscopic Laws. Due
to the change of scale, the statistical fluctuations of the relevant observables are
small compared to experimental or computational errors. The very nature of
our description is thus changed. Although the underlying, more fundamental
description yields predictions having subjective features due to the necessary use
of probabilities, it gives way to a reduced description that no longer involves
the observer. Since the variances are negligible, the physical quantities do not
need to be regarded as random variables. The expectation values
〈
Aˆi
〉
which
obey the reduced dynamics can be interpreted merely as values actually taken
in a given system. Their equations of motion then directly apply to individual
objects, without reference to a statistical ensemble. In spite of the disappear-
ance of probabilities at the macroscopic scale, the relevant entropy survives as
a quantity measurable indirectly through its variations (11) and characterizing
equilibrium, as well known in thermodynamics. Its probabilistic and subjec-
tive origin, its interpretation as missing information are not apparent; neither
are they for the other variables, the expectations Ai and the parameters γi of
the microscopic probability law. Actually all these quantities had already been
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introduced in thermodynamics at the macroscopic level, but the advent of sta-
tistical mechanics gave us a deeper understanding. Indeed, statistical mechanics
is a major tool of reductionism; its use explains the emergence at a larger scale
of new properties, new concepts and even different interpretations of physical
statements, such as here the emergence of objectivity from a microscopic theory
based on the subjective concepts of probability and information. Likewise, treat-
ing quantum measurements as a problem of statistical mechanics (Allahverdyan
et al, 2003) shows how ordinary probabilities emerge from the underlying irre-
ducible extension of probabilities which accounts for the non-commutation of
quantum observables.
Let us finally recall that the identification of entropy with a lack of infor-
mation or equivalently with disorder has contributed to the elucidation of the
paradox of Maxwell’s demon, which gave rise to discussions for more than one
century. An important step was the recognition of the equivalence between
information and negentropy (Brillouin, 1956). The entropy of a system spon-
taneously increases; however it may be lowered by some amount, provided the
“demon” or the experimentalist who acts upon this system makes use of some
amount of information at least equal to the decrease of the entropy. Conversely,
in order to acquire some information, we need to raise the entropy of some
system by a quantity at least equal to the amount of information gained. Infor-
mation theory thus enlightens many aspects of statistical physics.
The above text is issued from a talk given at the ESF conference on philosophical
and foundational issues in statistical physics, held in Utrecht on 28-30 November 2003.
I wish to thank Jos Uffink for his invitation to this conference and for comments.
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